Miranda Warnings Not Required When Motorist Charged with Driving While Intoxicated Is Requested to Submit to Chemical Testing by Schumer, Jayne B.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 61 
Number 4 Volume 61, Summer 1987, Number 4 Article 10 
June 2012 
Miranda Warnings Not Required When Motorist Charged with 
Driving While Intoxicated Is Requested to Submit to Chemical 
Testing 
Jayne B. Schumer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Schumer, Jayne B. (1987) "Miranda Warnings Not Required When Motorist Charged with Driving While 
Intoxicated Is Requested to Submit to Chemical Testing," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 61 : No. 4 , Article 
10. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol61/iss4/10 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
guidelines in the near future to prevent further confusion resulting
from ad hoc decisions by trial courts.
Suzanne Sonner Diviney
Miranda warnings not required when motorist charged with driv-
ing while intoxicated is requested to submit to chemical testing
The Constitution guarantees every individual the right to as-
sistance of counsel' and the privilege against self-incrimination in
criminal cases. 2 In Miranda v. Arizona,3 the United States Su-
preme Court held that a state has an affirmative duty to advise an
individual taken into police custody of these constitutional rights.4
U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides in part that, "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial ... and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Id. The accused is guaranteed the right to coun-
sel not only at his trial but at any critical confrontation with the prosecution during pretrial
proceedings where the absence of counsel might impede his right to a fair trial. See United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967). The fourteenth amendment has extended this
right to state criminal proceedings. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
Therefore, the accused "need not stand alone against the State" during any critical stage of
the prosecution. Wade, 388 U.S. at 226. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 16-38, at 1106-08 (1978) (discussing implications of right to counsel on criminal jus-
tice reform).
2 U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides in part that "[n]o person ...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.. . ." Id. The four-
teenth amendment precludes a state from abridging an individual's right against compul-
sory self-incrimination. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). Since the American sys-
tem of criminal prosecution is accusatorial rather than inquisitorial, both state and federal
governments are "constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently
and freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a charge against an accused out of his
own mouth." Id. at 7-8. However, the fifth amendment privilege protects an accused only
from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the state with evidence
of a testimonial or communicative nature. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764
(1966). This privilege does not apply to the withdrawal of blood for chemical analysis, as
this act is not considered testimonial compulsion. Id. at 765. See also People v. Haitz, 65
App. Div. 2d 172, 175, 411 N.Y.S.2d 57, 59-60 (4th Dep't 1978) (admission of evidence of
refusal to take chemical test not violative of fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-23, at 709-10 (overview of fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination).
3 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 467-69. In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that an individual taken into cus-
tody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way
must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one
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The New York Vehicle and Traffic Law provides, however, that a
motorist accused of driving while intoxicated impliedly consents to
chemical testing to determine the alcoholic content of his blood,5
and that a refusal to take the test may be used as evidence against
the defendant in a criminal trial. Furthermore, the New York
Court of Appeals has concluded that the admission of a defend-
will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Id. at 479.
Since the expansive Miranda ruling in 1966, the Supreme Court has significantly re-
stricted the applicability of Miranda in criminal prosecution cases. See, e.g., United States
v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973) (defendant's counsel need not be present while witness
shown photographs containing defendant's picture prior to trial); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 690 (1972) (defendant identified by robbery victim prior to indictment and before con-
sulting counsel); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (defendant's pretrial state-
ments, made without benefit of counsel, may be used to impeach trial testimony).
5 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1987). Section 1194 provides
in pertinent part:
1. Any person who operates a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to
have given his consent to a chemical test, of one or more of the following: his
breath, blood, urine or saliva, for the purpose of determining the alcohol and/or
drug content of his blood provided that such test is administered at the direction
of a officer:
(1) having reasonable grounds to believe such person to have been operating
in violation of any subdivision of section eleven hundred ninety-two and within
two hours after such person has been placed under arrest ....
Id. § 1194(1). The term "chemical test" refers to any chemical analysis of breath, blood,
urine or saliva which determines a subject's blood-alcohol content. See People v. Jones, 118
Misc. 2d 687, 693, 461 N.Y.S.2d 962, 966 (Albany County Ct. 1983). New York was the first
state to enact an implied consent statute. See New York State Joint Legislative Committee
on Motor Vehicle Problems, 3 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 25, 176th N.Y. Leg. 11 (1953). See, e.g.,
Ch. 854, [1953] N.Y. Laws 1876 (original statutory codification of current New York stat-
ute). Implied consent statutes are currently in force in all fifty states. See generally Ler-
blance, Implied Consent to Intoxication Tests: A Flawed Concept, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 39,
39 n.2 (1978) (discussing history of § 1194); King & Tipperman, The Offense of Driving
While Intoxicated: The Development of Statutory and Case Law in New York, 3 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 541 (1975) (discussing origin of § 1194).
All breath-testing devices are based upon Henry's Law, which states that at any given
temperature, the ratio between the concentration of alcohol in the blood and in the alveolar
air in the lungs is constant. See Jones, 118 Misc. 2d at 688 n.1, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 963 n.1. It
has been proven empirically that the ratio is 2,100:1; that is, 2,100 parts of deep lung air
contain an amount of alcohol equal to that in one part of blood. Id. This ratio has been
adopted by the National Highway Safety Council's Committee on Tests for Intoxication. Id.
It has also been established that breathalyzer tests are admissible in New York courts. See
People v. Donaldson, 36 App. Div. 2d 37, 40, 319 N.Y.S.2d 172, 176 (4th Dep't 1971).
6 See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(2) (McKinney 1986). The statute requires that the
accused driver be "informed that his license or permit to drive ... shall be immediately
suspended and subsequently revoked" upon his refusal to submit to a chemical test. Id.
Indeed, the evidence of a refusal to submit to blood testing is admissible "in any trial, pro-
ceeding or hearing ... only upon a showing that the person was given sufficient warning, in
clear and unequivocal language, of the effect of such refusal .... Id. § 1194(4).
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ant's refusal to submit to such testing does not violate his privilege
against self-incrimination.7 Recently, in People v. Sanchez," the
Criminal Court of New York County held that a motorist charged
with driving while intoxicated need not be given Miranda warnings
before being asked to undergo chemical testing.9
In Sanchez, the defendant was found in a semi-conscious state
in the driver's seat of his automobile following an accident.10 A
strong odor of alcohol was detected on the defendant and in the
vehicle.11 Consequently, he was placed under arrest for operating a
motor vehicle while intoxicated.12 Shortly before the permissible
statutory period for testing was to expire, the defendant was asked
to submit to a chemical test to determine the extent of his inebria-
tion.' 3 He refused to submit to the test, although he was informed
See People v. Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d 100, 103, 385 N.E.2d 584, 585, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845,
846 (1978), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 891 (1980); People v. Haitz, 65 App. Div. 2d 172, 177,
411 N.Y.S.2d 57, 61 (4th Dep't 1978).
134 Misc. 2d 726, 512 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1987).
Id. at 727, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 639; see infra notes 9-20 and accompanying text.
10 Sanchez, 134 Misc. 2d at 727, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
11 Id.
12 Id. The defendant was charged with violating section 1192 of the New York Vehicle
and Traffic Law. Id. Section 1192 provides in part:
1. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while his ability to operate such
motor vehicle is impaired by the consumption of alcohol ....
2. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while he has .10 of one per centum
or more by weight of alcohol in his blood as shown by chemical analysis of his
blood, breath, urine or saliva, made pursuant to the provisions of section eleven
hundred ninety-four of this chapter.
3. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while he is in an intoxicated
condition.
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 1192(1)-(3) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1987). This section has
withstood constitutional challenge on the grounds of being void for vagueness since the
terms "intoxicated" and "impaired" afford a defendant sufficient notice of prohibited con-
duct. See People v. Cruz, 48 N.Y.2d 419, 428, 399 N.E.2d 513, 517, 423 N.Y.S.2d 625, 629
(1979), appeal dismissed, 446 U.S. 901 (1980). In addition the word "operating" is markedly
broader than the term "driving" and may be proven by circumstantial evidence. See, e.g.,
People v. Blake, 5 N.Y.2d 118, 120, 154 N.E.2d 818, 819, 180 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 (1958) (de-
fendant seated alone in damaged automobile with engine running was "operating" motor
vehicle).
13 Sanchez, 134 Misc. 2d at 727, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 639. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §
1195 (McKinney 1976). Section 1195 provides in part:
1. Upon the trial of any actionor proceeding... alleged to have been commit-
ted by any person arrested for a violation of any subdivision of section eleven
hundred ninety-two, the court shall admit evidence of the amount of alcohol ...
in the defendant's blood as shown by a test administered pursuant to the provi-
sions ... of this chapter.
Id. § 1195(1).
New York accords the following evidentiary presumptions to the findings of a validly
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that such refusal to take the test might result in the revocation of
his license and could be introduced as evidence against him in
court. 4 He did, however, agree to perform a series of coordination
tests.' 5 Subsequently, the defendant moved to suppress a video-
tape which had recorded both his prior refusal and performance of
the coordination tests.'" After a hearing, the Judicial Hearing Of-
ficer recommended that the defendant's motion to suppress be
granted on the grounds that Miranda warnings had not been given
to the defendant prior to his refusal to take the chemical test."
The Criminal Court of New York County disagreed with this
conclusion and held that the videotape was admissible." Writing
for the court, Justice DeGrasse relied upon prior precedent which
had established that an arrested person is not entitled to Miranda
warnings prior to the withdrawal of blood for chemical analysis, 9
and that the admission of a defendant's uncoerced refusal to take a
chemical test does not violate an individual's right against self-in-
crimination.20 The Sanchez court additionally relied upon the de-
conducted chemical test. See id. § 1195(2). A test result which indicates a driver had be-
tween a .07 percent and a .10 percent alcohol level in his blood is prima facie evidence that
his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired. See id. § 1195(2)(c). A blood alcohol
level of between .05 percent and .07 percent is considered only relevant evidence in deter-
mining if an accused was driving while impaired. See id. § 1195(2)(b). A reading of .05
percent or less is prima facie evidence that the driver was not impaired by alcohol while
operating a motor vehicle. See id. § 1195(2)(a).
" See Sanchez, 134 Misc. 2d at 727, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 639; supra note 6 and accompany-
ing text.
Sanchez, 134 Misc. 2d at 727, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
Id. at 726, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
17 Id. at 727, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
18 Id. at 728, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
Id. at 727, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 639; see People v. Craft, 28 N.Y.2d 274, 270 N.E.2d 297,
321 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1971). The Craft court held that withdrawal or testing of blood samples
provides real or physical evidence rather than evidence of a communicative or testimonial
nature. Craft, 28 N.Y.2d at 276, 270 N.E.2d at 299, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 568. Therefore, blood
testing in the absence of a Miranda warning does not violate an accused's privilege against
self-incrimination, as a Miranda warnings is intended to protect a defendant against poten-
tial testimonial incrimination. Id. at 276-77, 270 N.E.2d at 299, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 568. Accord
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). In addition, since one accused of driving
while intoxicated may not prevent the state from conducting a blood test, the Craft court
asserted that there is neither need nor reason for the presence of counsel at the test. See
Craft, 28 N.Y.2d at 278, 270 N.E.2d at 299, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 569. It should be noted how-
ever, that Miranda was decided a month after the facts of Craft had occurred. Id. at 276,
270 N.E.2d at 298, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
2 Sanchez, 134 Misc. 2d at 727, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 639; see People v. Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d
100, 110, 385 N.E.2d 584, 589, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845, 849 (1978), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 891
(1980). The Thomas court ruled that evidence of the defendant's refusal to submit to a
chemical test was admissible even though the police officer did inform the defendant of his
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cisions of two appellate division courts which had concluded that
the failure to inform a person of his Miranda rights does not pre-
clude the admission into evidence of his refusal to take a chemical
test.21
Although the Supreme Court has held that an individual ac-
cused of driving while intoxicated does not have a constitutional
right to refuse a blood test,2 2 New York's implied consent statute
allows the defendant to make a choice regarding his legal rights
when deciding whether to submit to a chemical test.2 3 It is submit-
ted that New York courts have denied the accused his constitu-
tional right to counsel when evaluating the ramifications of that
choice. 4 Only when an accused drunk driver has requested counsel
and been denied, has his privilege of access to counsel been vio-
Miranda rights prior to the administration of the test. Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d at 103, 110, 385
N.E.2d at 585, 589, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 846, 851.
21 Sanchez, 134 Misc. 2d at 727, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 639. See also Hoffman v. Melton, 81
App. Div. 2d 709, 439 N.Y.S.2d 449 (3rd Dep't 1981). In Hoffman, the petitioner had been
arrested for driving while intoxicated and the police officer failed to advise him of his Mi-
randa rights prior to requesting him to submit to a chemical test. Id. at 709, 439 N.Y.S.2d at
450. On appeal to the Appellate Division, Third Department, the court held that the failure
to inform the individual of his Miranda rights does not preclude the admission into evidence
of his refusal to take a chemical test. Id. at 710, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 450-51.
This case is distinguishable from Sanchez in that Hoffman involved civil proceedings as
a result of the revocation of appellants license, rather than criminal proceedings to which
Miranda warnings apply. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See, e.g., People v.
Haitz, 65 App. Div. 2d 172, 411 N.Y.S.2d 57 (4th Dep't 1978). The Haitz court held that, as
the defendant does not have a constitutional right to refuse a chemical test, evidence of his
refusal is not violative of the fifth amendment. Id. at 176, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 60. The court
further stated that the failure to apprise a person arrested for driving while intoxicated of
his Miranda rights does not bar the admission of evidence that he refused to take a
breathalyzer. Id. at 176-77, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 60. However, it is noteworthy that the defend-
ant in Haitz was advised of his Miranda rights. Id. at 173, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 58. It is submit-
ted that the Haitz court's statement regarding Miranda rights was dicta and therefore with-
out precedential value. See generally Note, Public Outcry v. Individual Rights: Rights to
Counsel and the Drunk Driver's Dilemma, 69 MARQ. L. REV. 278 (1986) (results of sobriety
test may give rise to both criminal and civil proceedings).
22 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966). In Schmerber, the defendant
was arrested for driving while intoxicated and a blood sample was withdrawn for analysis.
Id. at 758. The defendant contended that the withdrawal and subsequent admissibility of
the results violated, inter alia, his rights to due process of law under the fourteenth amend-
ment, his privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment and his right to
counsel under the sixth amendment. Id. at 759. In an extensive opinion, the Court held that
evidence of the analysis of defendant's blood, taken after he was arrested, could not be
denied admission on fifth or fourteenth amendment grounds. Id. at 765, 771. It should be
noted that the defendant in Schmerber was informed of his Miranda rights prior to submit-
ting to the test. Id. at 769.
23 See supra notes 5 and 6 and accompanying text.
2 See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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lated under New York law. 25 In contrast, the United States Su-
preme Court specifically stated in Miranda v. Arizona that the im-
position of a requirement to request counsel would discriminate
against the defendant who is not aware of his rights.26 Therefore, it
is suggested that the Court of Appeals and, consequently, the
Sanchez court have erred by distinguishing between those defend-
ants who request the assistance of an attorney and those who do
not. Accordingly, it is suggested that the defendant should be enti-
tled to consult with an attorney regarding the consequences of his
choice within the allowable statutory period for performance of a
valid chemical test. Furthermore, to insure that the defendant is
adequately informed of his right to counsel, it is submitted that
Miranda warnings must be given to the defendant when he is
asked to submit to chemical testing.
Moreover, under the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law, a
driver's refusal to submit to chemical testing constitutes potential
inculpatory evidence.27 The fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to in-
criminate himself in any manner.28 However, the Supreme Court
has restricted this right to a protection against providing the state
21 See People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, 239 N.E.2d 351, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1968). In
Gursey, the Court of Appeals held that the denial of defendant's request for an opportunity
to telephone his lawyer before submitting to a chemical test, violates his right to counsel. Id.
at 228, 239 N.E.2d at 353, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 419. The court acknowledged that granting his
request would not have substantially interfered with the investigation, since the telephone
call would have been concluded in minutes. Id.
20 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470-71 (1966). The Court stated:
The defendant who does not ask for counsel is the very defendant who needs
counsel. We cannot penalize a defendant who, not understanding his constitu-
tional rights, does not make the formal request and by such failure demonstrates
his helplessness. To require the request would be to favor the defendant whose
sophistication or status had fortuitously prompted him to make it.
Id. (quoting People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 351, 398 P.2d 361, 369-70, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169,
177-78, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965)).
2 See, e.g., People v. Haitz, 65 App. Div. 2d 172, 411 N.Y.S.2d 57 (4th Dep't 1978). The
Haitz court stated that this law gives the state the right to obtain physical evidence in the
form of test results. See id. at 175, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 59. The defendant's right to refuse to
take a chemical test, however, is a qualified statutory right rather than a constitutional right
to remain silent. Id. Therefore, the Appellate Division concluded that since the defendant is
not asserting a constitutional right when he refuses the test, a foundation does not exist
upon which a fifth amendment argument may be built. See id. at 176, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 60.
28 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 467. The Court stated that warnings are prereq-
uisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant. Id. at 476. In addition,
"no distinction can be drawn between statements which are direct confessions and state-
ments which amount to admissions of part or all of an offense." Id.
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, rather
than physical evidence. 29 New York considers an accused a source
of physical evidence when blood is extracted to perform a chemical
test.30 It is submitted, however, that evidence of refusal is commu-
nicative and testimonial, since "the sole purpose for introducing
refusal evidence is to permit triers of fact to infer consciousness of
guilt."' 31 Therefore, it is suggested that an accused be given Mi-
randa warnings before a refusal is admitted as inculpatory
evidence.
Despite profound and legitimate interests in reducing acci-
dents caused by intoxicated drivers, the New York courts must
strike a balance between public policy considerations and the need
to protect the constitutional rights of the accused. A viable solu-
tion is to provide the accused with Miranda warnings which would
preserve his right against self-incrimination and allow him, inter
alia, to consult with an attorney, provided that he does so before
the expiration of the statutory time limit within which a valid
chemical test may be conducted. This procedure would protect the
constitutional rights of the accused, while leaving intact the poli-
cies advanced by the statute.
Jayne B. Schumer
29 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
20 See Haitz, 65 App. Div. 2d at 174, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 59; see also supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
31 People v. Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d 100, 111, 385 N.E.2d 584, 590, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845, 851
(1978) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 891 (1980).
It is submitted that the introduction of refusal evidence is detrimental to the accused, not-
withstanding the fact a test, had it been conducted, would have revealed levels below the
statutory presumption of intoxication. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAs. LAW § 1192 (McKinney 1986);
supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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